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EVALUATION REPORT



TRANSTEC

**UDF-GUI-10-355 - Judicial Reform: empowering magistrate-civil society
collaboration for Guinea's new democratic future**

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(i) Project data

The project 'Judicial Reform: empowering magistrate-civil society collaboration for Guinea's new democratic future' ran from the 1st December 2011 to the 30th November 2013, but some activities were prolonged until the end of March 2014. It had an overall budget of USD 425,000 and the UNDEF contribution accounted for USD 200,000 (47%). UNDEF was the larger single donor, and the further funds were provided by an individual grantor (Mr Milt Lauenstein¹) that made available USD 125,000 and by the United States Institute of Peace (additional USD 100,000, unplanned at the time of the Project Document).

The grantee was Swisspeace (a Swiss NGO), which managed the project as a spin-off of their larger project BEFORE. The grantee relied on the collaboration of two implementing partners, the Regional Council of Civil Society Organizations (CROSC, the Kankan branch of the National Council of Civil Society Organizations -CNOSCG) and the Association of Magistrates of Guinea.

The aim of the project was to contribute to the process of reform of the judiciary through the establishment of a '*new social contract on justice*' linking up Civil Society Organisations, magistrates and auxiliaries of justice.

The project strategy was based on two subsequent components (Outcomes), as follows:

- **Outcome 1** – Increased capacity for advocacy, monitoring and judicial oversight, to be achieved through:
 - o Training needs assessment of magistrates, CSO and key judiciary personnel.
 - o Conduction of training for each target group addressing the needs identified in the needs assessment.
 - o Sub-grants to local CSOs to implement at least 10 initiatives to '*advocate and promote public awareness of the need for judicial reform to local, community-based constituencies.*'
- **Outcome 2** – Enhanced capacity for dialogue and collaboration between civil society and judiciary on ways to improve the judicial system so that is more responsive to needs of the civil society, to be achieved through:
 - o Two joint regional CSO- judiciary workshops.
 - o Setting up of a joint civil society-judiciary platform.
 - o Development of a joint civil society-judiciary action plan.
 - o Promotion of the platform and the action plan.

¹ Mr Milt Lauenstein is a private donor committed to '*contribute to the prevention of the suffering and death associated with organized political violence.*' Since 2003 Mr Lauenstein has financed a few projects falling within this scope of action; based on the results of a test case project financed in 2005 in Guinea-Bissau, he became the main funder of the project BEFORE managed by Swisspeace, which –over the following years- intervened both in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea. In 2011 Mr Lauenstein took the decision to stop funding BEFORE; this decision is motivated as such in his website: '*BEFORE's management and Board of governors were committed to the idea that more effective governments are required to establish sustainable peace. I, on the other hand, was skeptical about the ability of outsiders to accomplish the needed governmental reforms, preferring to fund the more modest objective of helping local leaders to address immediate threats to peace. Therefore, in the summer of 2011, I notified BEFORE that I would reduce my funding and would discontinue it entirely after 2012.*' Since, Mr Lauenstein has been financing a project with a methodological approach different from BEFORE and the project BEFORE discontinued its activities after the UNDEF project in Guinea.

(ii) Evaluation findings

The **design of the intervention** was sound and lean; a convincing monitoring and evaluation plan was included in the project design.

The **relevance** of the project was assessed against different elements: *i) relevance to the UNDEF mandate* – this relevance was full, as the intervention links with the primary purpose of the Fund; *ii) relevance to Guinea* – this relevance was full, as well. The reform of the judiciary is one of the key priorities announced by the President of the Republic since 2010; its relevance became even higher following the legislative elections of September 2013, which marked a turning point into the process of transitioning out of the country from the heavy heritage of the recent dictatorship. The complex and well-articulated process adopted to identify the specific scope of action of the intervention ensured a full fitting of the aim of the project with the objectives of the reform; *iii) suitability of the areas of intervention* – Conakry and Kankan are the two most important judiciary districts of the Country and their selection is well justified; *iv) relevance of the methodology of intervention* – the methodology was suitable to the scope of the project; its key points of strength were the acknowledgement that training was preliminary to the setting up of the platform for dialogue, the inclusion of the mini-grant scheme, and the fact that the project was ambitious but realistic. However, the methodology did not include mechanisms to facilitate the replication of the project experiences, once the project ended; *v) relevance to the expertise of the grantee* – this element was null (the grantee did not have previous experience in the judiciary) and lamentably not identified in the project design.

The assessment of the **effectiveness** of the project in terms of delivery of its outputs is positive; there were delays in the delivery of some outputs of the Outcome 2, but these delays were fully justified by unforeseeable events. However, the late establishment of the platform had consequences in terms of impact. The project team was able to adapt with the due flexibility to unforeseeable events and to minimize their possible impact on the possibility to deliver.

The judgment about the **efficiency** of the project is definitely positive: the budget attribution is well justified and the co-funding of two additional donors was a critical factor of success for the project. The need to replace three employees who left the project; and the reschedule of some key activities did not impact on the overall project efficiency.

The **impact** of the first component (Outcome) of the project is positively assessed both in terms of quantitative indicators of achievement and in terms of behavioral changes of the participants to the activities of this Outcome. The delays in the establishment and running of the platform make impossible a clear-cut judgment about the impact of the second project component; however, there are likelihoods for this project component to contribute to the achievement of its sought impact, even if they depend on the materialization of some pre-conditions that are discussed under Sustainability.

There are three major conditions to be met in order to enable the project **sustainability**; these are: *i) the possibility for the project to replicate to the other judicial districts of the Country* – although a first round of fundraising conducted by Swisspeace did not achieve the intended effects, other opportunities may open-up, with particular reference to the major contribution (mEuro 20) that the EU has de-frozen to support the reform of the judiciary; *ii)*

the achievement by the platform of a higher level of visibility – although it is concluded that the platform has already achieved some visibility, more important steps remain to be made; iii) the further involvement of the platform in the process of reform of the judiciary.

Some major institutional and legal reforms passed since 2014 (such as the approval of the special status of judges, the establishment of the Superior Council of Magistrates, and the finalization of the Action Plan of the judicial reform) should have a positive effect as enabling factors of the achievement of the sustainability of the major legacy of the project, the civil society-judiciary platform.

(iii) Conclusions

- **The project relevance was high.** After the September 2013 elections, **Guinea** seems now **embarked in a process of democratic reforms**; the **reform of judiciary** (announced since 2010 as a priority for the Country) was confirmed as a **key priority** by the present government, which is tackling this aspect with determination. Important concrete results started to materialise since the beginning of 2014: they include the approval of the special status of judges, the establishment of the Superior Council of Magistrates, and the finalization of the Action Plan of the judicial reform.

- The idea to **facilitate dialogue between civil society, magistrates and auxiliaries of justice** was proposed by Swisspeace as a way for civil society to **participate in the process of reform of the judiciary**; and for helping de-escalating social conflicts before their radicalisation. The idea to establish a joint civil society-judiciary platform as an instrument for this collaboration was ground-breaking and proved to be a very opportune one.

- The **project** was **convincingly structured** around two components, well designed and its ambitions were consistent with the available resources. A well-thought **analysis** of **constraints** and a set of relevant **indicators** of performance were included in the project design. The project design included the provision for a sound activity of **Monitoring and Evaluation**, which is very much appreciated. However, the grantee did not specify that it had **no previous experiences** in implementing projects in the **justice sector**; this should have been well underlined in the Project Document as an important factor of **risk** for the project.

- Throughout **2013** Guinea was deeply **affected by a turbulent social and political situation**: several mass protests to request democratic elections turned into clashes, ignited also by ethnic tensions. About 150 deaths represent the toll of this year, which coincided with the second year of life of the project. There were **impacts** on the **timely delivery** of **some of the expected outputs**, particularly under the Outcome 2. In the end, the **largest majority** of the outputs were **delivered**, but there were some effects in terms of impact. The project team proved an appreciable capacity of adaptation to unforeseeable events.

- The project was **efficiently managed** and the budget contributed by UNDEF was appropriately allocated and fully spent. Swisspeace proved to be highly committed to

results; this is proved by the fact that about 81% of the budget was allocated to project activities, with a minimal impact of further budget items. The rescheduling of some activities had some minimal impact in terms of budget due to double travel costs and renting of meeting space; this is justified and was well managed. The project cash suffered of a theft of USD 18,000, and a judicial action has been initiated against the suspect responsible (a former member of the staff.) The grantee refunded the project with own funds.

- In terms of **impact** the project **contribution is very high for the Output 1** (capacity building and dialogue) while the **short time** elapsed since the entering in operation of the platform **prevented the materialisation of signs of impact of the Output 2** (collaboration to the process of reform.) However, the potentialities for the major legacy of the project (the platform) to contribute to the materialisation of the project impact are realistic and some early signs are encouraging.

- The **pre-conditions** for the achievement of the **lost-lasting effects** of results are still **to be met**, and this is by large due to the mentioned delays. The deployment countrywide of the project is maybe the most critical of these conditions, and could have been mitigated since the project design.

- There are two elements making up the **UNDEF added value** of this intervention; they are the high reputation of the UN system in Guinea, which proved to be a useful element of credentials for the project staff throughout the life of the intervention; and the low administrative and bureaucratic pressure on the grantee, which proved to be a key element that facilitated the various cycles of replanning of the project activities.

(iv) Recommendations

A **first cluster of recommendations** aim at encouraging future projects to draw on the successful experiences made by this project; they are:

- To ensure a **sound design of the project logic of intervention** and to aim to achieve **results** that are **consistent with** the available **resources**. (Reference to Conclusion 3).

- To include a sound **plan for monitoring and evaluation** as an **integral part** of the **project design**. (Reference to Conclusion 3).

- To keep the **projects flexible** and **adaptable to unforeseeable** events as relevant, while ensuring that the orientation towards the final objectives of the interventions is always reflected on new / rescheduled activities (reference to Conclusion 5).

A **second cluster of recommendations** is based on two aspects that this project should have better addressed:

- To bind **applicants** to **identify** in their proposals not only external but also **internal risks** such as the absence of key personnel or of in-house expertise that could endanger the success of the intervention. (Reference to Conclusion 3).

- To invite grantees to reflect and **propose solutions** to the **need to deploy projects** of a pilot nature **to the whole territory** of the country, **in case of their success**. This could be addressed since the project design phase. (Reference to Conclusion 8)

II. RÉSUMÉ EXÉCUTIF

(i) Présentation du projet

Le projet «Réforme judiciaire: renforcer la collaboration entre les magistrats et la société civile pour l'avenir de la nouvelle Démocratie Guinéenne» a été mis en œuvre du 1er Décembre 2011 au 30 Novembre 2013, bien que certaines activités aient été prolongées jusqu'à la fin Mars 2014. Le budget du projet s'élevait à 425.000 USD. Ainsi le financement de 200.000 USD octroyé par le FNUD représentait la source principale de financement du projet et 47% des fonds. Swisspeace a en effet pu compter sur d'autres sources de financement, telles que celle du donateur individuel, M. Milt Lauenstein², pour un montant de 125.000 USD mais aussi du United States Institute of Peace à hauteur de 100.000 USD (contribution non prévue au moment de la rédaction du Document de Projet).

Le bénéficiaire du projet a été Swisspeace (une ONG suisse), qui a géré le projet comme un sous-activité de leur projet BEFORE. Pour la mise en œuvre le bénéficiaire a collaboré avec deux partenaires locaux, notamment le Conseil régional des organisations de la société civile (CROSC, la branche de Kankan du Conseil national des organisations de la société civile-CNOSCG) et l'Association des magistrats de Guinée.

L'objectif du projet était de contribuer au processus de réforme du système judiciaire à travers la création d'un «nouveau contrat social sur la justice» reliant les organisations de la société civile, les magistrats et les auxiliaires de justice.

La stratégie du projet reposait sur deux composantes successives (Résultats), comme suit:

- **Résultat 1** – Augmentation de la capacité de plaider, de suivi et de contrôle judiciaire, objectif à atteindre par:
 - o L'évaluation des besoins en formation des magistrats, des OSC et des auxiliaires de justice.
 - o La réalisation d'une formation pour chaque groupe cible afin de répondre aux besoins identifiés dans l'évaluation des besoins.
 - o L'octroi d'au moins 10 subventions à des OSC locales avec pour but de favoriser le «plaider et promouvoir la sensibilisation du public à la nécessité de la réforme judiciaire pour les communautés locales. »
- **Résultat 2** – Renforcer la capacité de dialogue et de collaboration entre la société civile et le pouvoir judiciaire sur les moyens d'améliorer le système judiciaire pour mieux l'adapter aux besoins de la société civile, objectif à atteindre par:

² Monsieur Milt Lauenstein est un donateur privé engagé à « contribuer à la prévention de la souffrance et de la mort associée à la violence politique organisée ». Depuis 2003 M. Lauenstein a financé ou cofinancé quelques projets relevant de cet objectif spécifique. Sur la base des résultats d'un premier projet pilote financé en 2005 en Guinée-Bissau, il a été par la suite le principal bailleur de fonds du projet BEFORE géré par Swisspeace, qui -dans le cours des années suivantes- est intervenu à la fois en Guinée-Bissau et en Guinée. En 2011 M. Lauenstein prendra la décision de cesser de financer ce projet, décision qu'il motive dans son site web avec ces mots: «La direction et le conseil d'administration de BEFORE se sont convaincus que des gouvernements plus efficaces sont nécessaires pour établir une paix durable. Moi, par contre, j'étais sceptique quant à la capacité de personnes venues de l'étranger de suggérer des réformes gouvernementales efficaces, préférant financer l'objectif plus modeste d'aider les responsables locaux à faire face aux menaces immédiates à la paix. Par conséquent, dans l'été de 2011, j'ai informé BEFORE que j'allais réduire mon financement et le cesser complètement à la fin 2012. » Depuis, M. Lauenstein est engagé dans le financement d'un projet avec un approche méthodologique différent de ce du projet BEFORE et le projet BEFORE a cessé d'exister après le projet du FNUD en Guinée.

- Deux ateliers régionaux communs entre des OSC et des membres du judiciaire.
- Mise en place d'une plate-forme commune entre la société civile et le judiciaire.
- Développement d'un plan d'action commun entre la société civile et le judiciaire.

(ii) Résultats de l'évaluation

La **structure de l'intervention** a été solide et simple ; un plan de suivi et d'évaluation convaincant a été inclus au moment de la conception du projet.

La **pertinence** du projet a été évalué par rapport à des éléments différents: (i) *la pertinence par rapport au mandat du FNUD* - cette pertinence a été totale, car le projet a un lien étroit avec l'objectif principal du Fonds ; (ii) *la pertinence par rapport à la Guinée* – cette pertinence a été totale également. Annoncée par le Président de la République depuis 2010 comme l'une des priorités du pays, la réforme du système judiciaire a été réaffirmée comme priorité à la suite des élections législatives de septembre 2013 qui ont marqué un tournant dans le processus de transition du pays et dans sa sortie du lourd héritage de la dictature récente. Le processus complexe et bien articulé adopté pour déterminer la portée de l'intervention a assuré un lien étroit entre le projet et les objectifs de la réforme ; (iii) *la pertinence des zones d'intervention* - Conakry et Kankan sont les deux districts judiciaires les plus importantes du pays et leur sélection est bien justifiée; (iv) *la pertinence de la méthodologie d'intervention* - la méthodologie était appropriée à la portée du projet ; ses principaux points forts ont été d'avoir utilisé la formation comme une composante indispensable et préalable à la mise en place de la plate-forme entre les OCS et le judiciaire ; l'inclusion du schéma de petites subventions ; et le caractère ambitieux, mais réaliste de l'intervention. Cependant, la méthode a oublié d'inclure des mécanismes pour faciliter la réplique d'expériences une fois le projet terminé; (v) *la pertinence de l'expertise du bénéficiaire* – la pertinence sous ce profil a été nulle car le bénéficiaire n'avait pas d'expérience préalable dans le système judiciaire. De façon regrettable, cet élément n'avait pas été identifié au moment de la conception du projet.

L'évaluation de **l'efficacité** du projet en terme de ses extrants est positive; il y a eu des retards dans la livraison de certains extrants du Résultat 2, mais ces retards sont pleinement justifiés par des événements imprévisibles majeurs. Cependant, la mise en place tardive de la plate-forme a eu quelques conséquences en terme d'impact. L'équipe du projet a su s'adapter avec une remarquable flexibilité à des événements imprévisibles et –par conséquent- a pu minimiser leur impact possible sur l'efficacité du projet.

Le jugement sur **l'efficacité** du projet est certainement positif: l'attribution des ressources disponibles aux différents postes budgétaires est justifiée et le cofinancement des deux donateurs additionnels a été un facteur essentiel de la réussite du projet. La nécessité de remplacer trois employés qui ont quitté le projet; et le réaménagement de certaines activités clés n'a pas eu d'incidence sur l'efficacité globale du projet.

L'impact de la première composante (Résultat 1) du projet est évalué positivement en terme d'indicateurs quantitatifs de réalisation et en terme de changements de comportement des

participants aux activités. Les retards dans la mise en place et le fonctionnement de la plateforme rendent impossible un jugement définitif sur l'impact de la deuxième composante du projet. Cependant, il reste probable que la deuxième composante du projet contribue à la réalisation de l'impact qui lui est associé, même si ces probabilités dépendent de la matérialisation de certaines pré-conditions, abordées dans le chapitre sur la durabilité.

Ils existent trois grandes conditions à remplir afin d'atteindre la **durabilité** des résultats du projet: i) la possibilité de pouvoir appliquer le modèle du projet aux autres districts judiciaires du pays. Même si une première recherche de fonds menée par Swisspeace n'a pas atteint les effets escomptés, d'autres possibilités pourraient s'ouvrir, avec une référence particulière à la contribution majeure (20 millions d'Euros) que l'Union Européenne a débloqué pour soutenir la réforme du système judiciaire, à la suite des dernières élections ; ii) la capacité de la plateforme d'obtenir un niveau plus élevé de visibilité – même si des résultats ont déjà été obtenus sur ce plan ; iii) une participation accrue de la plateforme dans le processus de la réforme du judiciaire.

Des réformes institutionnelles et législatives majeures adoptées dans le pays depuis début 2014 (telle que l'approbation du statut particulier des juges, la mise en place du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature et la mise au point du Plan d'action de la réforme judiciaire) devraient avoir un effet positif sur l'héritage du projet, la plateforme civilo-judiciaire, et sur sa durabilité.

(iii) Conclusions

- La pertinence du projet a été élevée. Les élections de septembre 2013 ont marqué l'engagement de la **Guinée sur la voie de réformes démocratiques**; la **réforme du système judiciaire** (annoncée depuis 2010 comme une priorité pour le pays) a été à nouveau choisie comme **prioritaire** par le gouvernement actuel, qui a réaffirmé sa détermination sur le sujet. Des résultats concrets et majeurs ont commencé à se matérialiser depuis le début de l'année 2014. Ils comprennent l'approbation du statut particulier des juges, la mise en place du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, et la finalisation du plan d'action de la réforme judiciaire.

- L'idée de **faciliter le dialogue entre la société civile, la magistrature et les auxiliaires de justice** a été proposée par Swisspeace comme un moyen pour la société civile de participer au processus de réforme du système judiciaire; et pour aider à désamorcer des conflits sociaux avant leur radicalisation. L'idée de créer une plateforme commune entre la société civile et des magistrats en tant qu'instrument de cette collaboration était révolutionnaire et s'est avérée être très opportune.

- Le projet a été **articulé** d'une **façon convaincante** autour de deux composantes, il a été bien conçu et ses ambitions étaient compatibles avec les ressources disponibles. Une bonne analyse des **contraintes externes** du projet et un ensemble d'**indicateurs de performance** pertinents ont été inclus dans sa conception. La conception du projet a inclus un **plan de suivi et évaluation** adéquat, démarche très louable. Toutefois, le bénéficiaire n'a pas précisé qu'il n'avait **pas d'expériences antérieures** dans la mise en

œuvre des projets dans le **secteur de la justice**; cela aurait pourtant dû être souligné dans le document de projet comme un facteur important de **risque** pour l'intervention.

- Tout au long de l'année **2013** la Guinée a été profondément **frappée par une situation sociale et politique tourmentée**: plusieurs manifestations de masse, organisées pour demander des élections démocratiques, ont tourné en affrontements, également en raison de tensions ethniques. 150 décès ont été dénombrés lors de la deuxième année de vie du projet. Ce contexte impacta la tenue du calendrier initial du projet et des délais fixés pour la réalisation de **certaines activités** de la deuxième composante (Résultat 2). Finalement, la **large majorité** des **extrants** ont été **livrés**, mais il y a eu quelques effets en terme d'impact. On note toutefois que l'équipe du projet s'est avérée avoir une capacité appréciable d'adaptation à des événements imprévisibles.

- Le projet a été **géré efficacement** et le budget fourni par le FNUD a été correctement attribué et entièrement dépensé. Swisspeace s'est avéré être très engagé par rapport aux résultats; cela est attesté par le fait que près de 81% du budget a été alloué aux activités du projet, avec un impact minimal des autres postes budgétaires. Le rééchelonnement de certaines activités a eu un impact minimal en termes financiers; cela a été justifié et bien géré. La caisse du projet a souffert d'un vol de 18.000 USD, mais une action judiciaire a été engagée contre le suspect (un ancien membre du personnel.) Le bénéficiaire a entièrement remboursé le projet sur fonds propres.

- En terme d'**impact**, la contribution du projet est **très élevée** pour la **première composante** (renforcement des capacités et dialogue), tandis que le **peu de temps** écoulé depuis l'entrée en fonction de la plateforme a **empêché la matérialisation des signes de l'impact de la deuxième composante** (collaboration au processus de la réforme). Cependant, le potentiel de la plateforme, perçue comme l'héritage principal du projet, de contribuer à la concrétisation de l'impact du projet est réaliste et les premiers signes sont encourageants.

- Les **conditions préalables à la durabilité** des résultats sont encore à **atteindre**, et ceci surtout en raison des délais mentionnés. La possibilité d'une extension à tout le territoire du pays est peut-être la plus critique de ces conditions, et aurait pu être mitigée au stade de la conception du projet.

- Deux éléments ont constitué la **valeur ajoutée FNUD** sur cette intervention; la très bonne réputation du système des Nations Unies en Guinée, qui s'est avérée être un élément utile pour le personnel du projet tout au long de la vie de l'intervention; et la basse pression administrative et bureaucratique sur le bénéficiaire, qui s'est également avérée être un élément clé de facilitation des différents cycles de rééchelonnement de certaines activités du projet.

(iv) Recommandations

Une **première série de recommandations** encourage les projets futurs à s'appuyer sur les expériences positives réalisées par ce projet; à savoir :

- Engager les soumissionnaires à baser leur projet sur une **logique d'intervention bien structurée** et à viser des **résultats** qui soient **compatibles avec les ressources disponibles**. De ce point de vue, ce projet a été un cas évident de réussite (référence à la Conclusion 3).

- Engager les soumissionnaires à **inclure -comme une partie intégrante** de la conception de leur **projet-** un **plan** solide de **suivi et évaluation**. De ce point de vue aussi, ce projet a été un cas de réussite (référence à la Conclusion 3).

- Garantir un bon niveau de **souplesse** de la gestion du projet de façon à pouvoir **l'adapter** –le cas échéant- à des **événements imprévisibles** tout en veillant à garantir que les activités nouvelles ou bien rééchelonnées soient toujours cohérentes avec les objectifs finaux de l'intervention (référence à la Conclusion 5).

Une **deuxième série de recommandations** est basée sur deux aspects que ce projet aurait dû mieux aborder:

- Engager les soumissionnaires à **identifier** dans leurs propositions non pas seulement les risques externes mais aussi les **risques potentiels internes du projet** tels que l'absence de personnel-clé ou bien d'expertise-clé qui pourraient compromettre le succès de l'intervention (référence à la Conclusion 3).

- Sensibiliser les bénéficiaires à réfléchir et proposer des **solutions** à la nécessité de **déployer des projets** de nature **pilote** sur une échelle locale à **l'ensemble du territoire du pays**, en **cas de succès** de ces projets pilotes. Cela pourrait se faire dès la phase de conception du projet (référence à la Conclusion 8).

III. INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

i. The project and evaluation objectives

The project '*Judicial reform: empowering magistrate-civil society collaboration for Guinea's new democratic future*' ran from the 1st December 2011 to the 30th November 2013, but some activities were prolonged until the end of March 2014. The overall planned budget was USD 325,000; the UNDEF contribution counted for USD 200,000 and an individual grantor (Mr Milt Lauenstein) made available the residual USD 125,000. Additional USD 100,000 (unplanned at the time of the application to UNDEF) were provided by the United States Institute of Peace. USD 20,000 were retained for Monitoring and Evaluation purposes.

The grantee was Swisspeace, a Swiss NGO, which managed the project as a spin-off of their larger project BEFORE. The project was implemented in the districts of Conakry (the capital city of Guinea and largest judicial centre of the country) and Kankan (the second largest judicial centre of Guinea.)

The aim of the project was to facilitate dialogue and collaboration between members of the Judiciary and Civil Society as a way to support enhanced access to justice. The key mechanism to achieve this objective was the establishment of a joint civil society-judicial platform, with the scope to develop common proposals and actions linking up with the process of reform of the Judiciary in Guinea.

The evaluation of this project is part of the larger evaluation of the Rounds, 2, 3 and 4 of UNDEF-funded projects. Its purpose is to "contribute towards a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved³".

ii. Evaluation methodology

The evaluation was conducted by a team composed of an international expert/team leader and a national expert from Guinea under the terms of the framework agreement between UNDEF and Transtec. Security and public health conditions at the time of the evaluation advised against international travels to Guinea. As a consequence the evaluation was remotely coordinated by the team leader and based on: i) document analysis (project documentation, literature, web search); ii) in-country interviews conducted by the national expert following semi-structured templates developed by the team leader and under his coordination, and; iii) phone interviews conducted by the team leader with the participation of the national expert in June and July.

In accordance with the agreed process, the evaluation aimed to answer questions across the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of *relevance*, *effectiveness*, *efficiency*, *impact*, and *sustainability*, as well as the additional criterion of *UNDEF value*

³ Operational manual for the UNDEF-funded project evaluations, page 6

added (see Annex 1).

The evaluation took place in June and July 2014, with fieldwork conducted during the two first weeks of July. The stakeholders interviewed are listed in the Annex 4. Both individual and group interviews were conducted; they included the relevant project staff, the hierarchy of the grantee, beneficiaries of the project (magistrates and civil society organizations) media and staff of other international organizations financing projects in the same or related areas of intervention. The field interviews were organised in Conakry, Fria, Dubréka; further remote interviews were conducted with stakeholders based in Kankan.

iii. Development context

During the past fifteen years the Republic of Guinea has experienced a deterioration of its socio-political climate marked in particular by: (i) Its involvement (2000) in a situation of political instability which had long affected the rest of West Africa with internal tensions and rebels crossing the borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone; this situation seemed for a time that would have lead to civil war. (ii) Extraordinary measures agreed in 2003 and agreed with its neighbors to tackle the insurgents. (iii) Massive anti-government protests in 2006 and 2007, resulting in the appointment of a new prime minister. (iv) The seizing of power by a military junta (lead by Moussa Dadis Camara) in December 2008 following the death of the former President Lansana Conté. Mass protests against the seizing of power became violent and were cruelly repressed by the army: in September 2009, 157 people were massacred in Conakry and several violations of women and mutilations were perpetrated. Many foreign governments withdrew their support to the new regime and the International Criminal Court (seized on these facts) instructed the Guinean courts to deal with these cases at first according to the procedures. Following a shot, Mr Camara went abroad for medical treatment and then agreed to remain outside Guinea for facilitating the transition to a civilian ruling of the country. (v) Social and political tensions exacerbated by allegations of fraud on the occasion of the electoral campaign and the first round of presidential elections held in June 2010, which led to killings in Conakry and other towns. The second turn was postponed several times and was finally held in November. Alpha Condé, the leader of the at-time opposition party Rally of the Guinean People (RGP), won the elections and promised to reform the security sector and review mining contracts. (vi) A failed attempted coup in July 2011, a situation of continued mass protests affected by killings and administrative delays, which all led to the decision of President Condé (April 2012) to postpone, indefinitely, the legislative elections, affirming that there was the need to ensure that they were 'transparent and democratic'. The election was originally planned to be held in June 2007. (vii) Further massive protests and ethnic clashes throughout the year 2013, organised by the opposition fearing irregularities in the process of registering the voters. Some of these protests turned violent, as well and their toll was of about 150 deaths.

The legislative elections were finally held in September 2013 and the President Condé's party (RPG) –together with its allies- won a tiny majority in the National Assembly and are now ruling the country.

In spite of its enormous natural potentials, Guinea remains in the category of the least developed countries, and among the last ones according to poverty indicators. Socio-economic poverty has increased as evidenced by the degradation of key financial economic indicators highlighted by the evaluation of public finances carried out in 2013 by the

International Monetary Fund (2013 PEFA Assessment).

Given the adverse effects of repeated crises and of major institutional problems, after the election some partners of Guinea (European Union, United Nations, regional organizations including ECOWAS and others) have revamped or re-initiated a process of mobilization of technical and financial support, mainly targeting (i) the strengthening of dialogue between political parties, (ii) the reduction of social tensions, (iii) education and training of various target groups (youth and women in particular) on basic principles of citizenship and the rule of law, (iv) support to major reforms including, among others, the reform of the security forces and defense, and the judicial reform.

Over the years, the judiciary in Guinea was repeatedly accused by media, civil society and international observers to be corrupted and inefficient; several are the cases of legal decisions that were never enforced. Among the main causes of inefficiency of the judiciary, the absence of information exchange among judges, enforcement bodies and the wide society is frequently quoted by many. Following his election in 2010, President Alpha Condé proclaimed the year 2013 as the year of justice and announced an ambitious plan of reforms for modernising the judiciary. However, the turbulent situation in the country had negative effects on these plans and the reform was never effectively initiated until the period following the 2013 legislative elections.

Since the beginning of 2014, significant results have been achieved in the reform of judiciary; they include the approval of the special status of judges, the establishment of the Superior Council of Magistrates, and the finalization of the Action Plan of the judicial reform.

IV. PROJECT STRATEGY

(i) Project strategy and approach

The **long-term strategy** of the project was to contribute to the process of reform of the judiciary through the establishment of a *‘new social contract on justice.’*

The rationale of the project relied on two main considerations:

1. Civil society organisations (CSO) did not have basic knowledge and practice of advocacy, monitoring and judicial oversight;
2. There were no institutionalised mechanisms in place in the country to facilitate dialogue and collaboration between civil society and the judiciary.

These two aspects had to be tackled by the project with the setting up of a joint civil society-judicial platform for judicial reform. The platform had the main purpose to advocate the common interests of magistrates and civil society as a way to influence and contribute to the process of reform of the judiciary. Indirectly, the platform had the purpose to facilitate access to justice of ordinary citizens.

In order to achieve these objectives, the project adopted a lean and convincing strategy based on two serial outcomes, to be roughly achieved in the two consecutive years of the project:

- **Outcome 1** – Increased capacity for advocacy, monitoring and judicial oversight, to be achieved through:
 - o Training needs assessment of magistrates, CSO and key judiciary personnel.
 - o Conduction of training for each target group addressing the needs identified in the needs assessment.
 - o Sub-grants to local CSOs to implement at least 10 initiatives to *‘advocate and promote public awareness of the need for judicial reform to local, community-based constituencies.’*
- **Outcome 2** – Enhanced capacity for dialogue and collaboration between civil society and judiciary on ways to improve the judicial system so that is more responsive to needs of the civil society, to be achieved through:
 - o Two joint regional CSO- judiciary workshops.
 - o Setting up of the joint civil society-judiciary platform.
 - o Development of a joint civil society-judiciary action plan.
 - o Promotion of the platform and the action plan.

The project had to be implemented in the two main judiciary districts of the country, Conakry and Kankan.

The project document contains a well-thought analysis of constraints, which retrospectively proved to include all the relevant assumptions and risks of the intervention.

In extreme synthesis, the **assumptions** were:

- Stable political and security conditions, particularly during elections;
- Genuine political support to judicial reform;
- Strong public support to democratic change;
- Cooperation from partners / beneficiaries;
- CSO willingness and capacity to participate.

The project design identified four elements of **potential risk** for the project; they were:

- A slow pace of implementation of the reform of the judiciary;
- Cross-cutting tensions and divisions among participants to the platform due to the electoral campaign;
- Tensions civil society-judiciary due to the investigations into crimes committed in September 2009 (see bullet iv of the chapter 'Development context');
- Corrupt magistrates and other judiciary personnel participating to the project to boycott it.

The Annex II to the Project Document spells out (among other) the key quantitative indicators of performance of the project. They are sound and comprehensive, and provide a good basis for the assessment of the main workproducts of the project.

The project design includes provision for a sound and regular activity of monitoring and self-evaluation (M&E) of the results of the intervention. This applies both to the main activities of the project; and to the activities to be carried by sub-grantees. The provision for M&E is opportune and very much appreciated as it is a clear factor indicating the commitment of Swisspeace to the achievement of the project results.

The **Grantee** (Implementing Agency) was **Swisspeace** on behalf of the **project BEFORE** - Guinea. Swisspeace (a Swiss foundation) is a '*practice-oriented peace research institute*'; their main focus of action is to '*analyze the causes of violent conflicts and develop strategies for their peaceful transformation.*' The project BEFORE⁴, financed by an individual grantor (Mr Milt Lauenstein) and managed by Swisspeace with the fundraising support of the Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP) aimed at helping prevent the devastation of violent conflicts in fragile states. Active in Guinea Bissau since 2004, in 2008 the project considered the difficult situation in Guinea as a possible source of an uncontrolled escalation of violence; based on the findings from a preliminary conflict analysis conducted in 2008 that suggested a possible role for the project, BEFORE facilitated (mid 2009) a Conflict analysis seminar involving about 60 local partners and skilled facilitators aimed at identifying different areas for a possible intervention of the project, with the objective to help de-escalating internal conflicts and violence. The Conflict analysis suggested that –in order to hit the objective- 5 major areas of work were needed, including the strengthening of the capacities of the judiciary in preventing and managing the conflicts through an increased efficiency of its working methods and a requalification of the relations among the different actors of the 'justice system.' Further analysis allowed to identify a specific 'niche' scope of work for the project BEFORE in the facilitation of the dialogue between judiciary and civil society as a way to contribute to the strengthening of the capacities of the judiciary within the frame of its announced reform; consistently, a series of fundraising activities were conducted. The project financed by UNDEF is the outcome of this process.

For the implementation of the project, Swisspeace relied on two **Implementing Partners**:

- The **Regional Council of Civil Society Organizations** (CROSC) - Kankan branch office of the National Council of Civil Society Organizations (CNOSCG).
- The **Association of Magistrates** of Guinea.

The two Implementing Partners had the main objective to be the relay between the UNDEF project and their respective communities of reference, with a series of delegated interventions that are spelled out in the Project Document. The Association of Magistrates

⁴ Information not contained in the Project Document and gathered during the evaluation.

(only professional association of Guinean judges) represented furthermore the possibility for the project to involve magistrates: because of their profession in fact magistrates shall abstain from participating to any political or advocacy activity in the country, which can be on the contrary exerted by their Association, holding the NGO statute.

(ii) Logical framework

The framework in the next page aims to capture the project logic of the intervention. It is based on the project proposal and therefore captures the sequence of activities, results, and impacts. It is against this benchmark that the evaluation is conducted. Some reconstruction is admitted, in particular the identification of the Medium Term Impacts, which were not spelled out in the Project Document; and in the reformulation of the Long-term Development Objectives.

Project Activities	Intended outcomes	Medium Term Impacts	Long Term Development Objectives
1. Comprehensive training needs assessment: civil society and judiciary 2. Course outline, content and related materials preparation for the training below 3. Delivery of training to 3 clusters of trainees: 60 magistrates, 60 CSOs representatives, 60 auxiliaries of justice; overall 6 sessions for 180 participants. Gender target: 30% of women trainees. 4. 10 advocacy and public awareness initiatives with local CSO partners (to be identified)	Outcome 1 – Increased capacity of CSOs, magistrates and key judicial personnel for advocacy, monitoring and judicial oversight.	Application by judges and key judiciary staff of the new knowledge acquired in their professional work (links with Activities 1, 2, 3) Application by CSOs of the new knowledge acquired in their advocacy and support work (links with Activities 1, 2, 3) Increased knowledge at the wide social level of the judiciary and the need to enhance dialogue (links with Activities 4)	Contribution to the overall process of reform of the judiciary in Guinea Contribute to the emerging of an independent judiciary able to effectively deliver justice in line with national and international standards
1. 2 joint CSO-judiciary workshops (Conakry and Kankan) to facilitate dialogue and relationship 2. Setting up of the joint civil society-judicial platform 3. Platform Action Plan development, with 12 recommended actions (3 on gender issues) on ways to improve judiciary as to better respond to societal needs 4. Action plan widely distributed and promoted	Outcome 2 – Enhanced dialogue and collaboration on how to improve the judicial system so that it is more responsive to civil society needs.	Proposals and concerns formulated by the platform addressed during the process of reform of the judiciary	Contribute to enhance access to justice, greater transparency and public trust

V. EVALUATION FINDINGS

(i) Relevance

The assessment of relevance should take into consideration several aspects; they are:

- **Relevance to the UNDEF mandate:** there is no doubt that the project was highly relevant to the primary purpose of UNDEF (*'to strengthen the voice of civil society and ensure the participation of all groups in democratic practices'*), in particular because the intervention aimed at enhancing *'democratic dialogue and support for constitutional processes, civil society empowerment, including the empowerment of women, civic education.'*

- **Relevance to Guinea:** the relevance to the needs of the country was full. As described above, the objective to reform the judicial system was declared since at least the year 2010 (some interviewees mentioned some early official statements expressing the same objective but no concrete references were made) and never concretised. A concise and effective description of the state of the judiciary system in Guinea is contained in the Executive Summary to the 2011 study: 'Guinea: police and judiciary' prepared by Landinfo (Country of Origin Information Centre) for the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police and other national authorities⁵: *'Guinean police and judiciary are subject to structural problems that prevent them from providing effective assistance to citizens. Abuse of power and physical violence are part of the police methods in use. Justice, known for its slowness because of lack of means and independence, consequently lacks of legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. Corruption is a major problem that affects both institutions, suggesting that the rich are above the laws. In this context, most conflicts between ordinary citizens are resolved without recourse to the courts, even if the customary law has no official status in the country.'* The complex process adopted by the project BEFORE to identify this scope of intervention well before the granting of the UNDEF funds (see Chapter III.i) is sound and deserves the highest consideration. Retrospectively, it is confirmed that the reform of judiciary is still a very high priority in Guinea, and the international donors' community is now coordinating its efforts to support the process after the September 2013 elections, which had the effect of de-freezing aid from a key donor such as the European Union.

- **Suitability of the selected areas:** the project targeted the judicial districts of Conakry and Kankan. The selection was sound, as these are the largest judiciary districts of the country; it was furthermore challenging for the project as travels between the two areas of intervention require about 6 hours by car. There are 10 Tribunals of first instance in Guinea in each of the country's regions, respectively in Boké, Kindia, Mamou, Labé, Kankan, Faranah, N'Zerekore and three in the special zone of Conakry. There are only two Courts of Appeal (second instance) and these are located in Conakry and Kankan. The map in Figure 1 shows the districts of the Tribunals of first instance and the location of the Tribunals of second instance of the country (the areas selected by the project, underlined in red.) No judicial statistics are available to size the dimensions of these two judicial districts, which anyhow represents a regional population of respectively 1,667,864 habitants

⁵ Original text in Norwegian, this is an English version of the evaluator based on an unofficial translation in French of the paper (quoted)

(Conakry, seat of the capital city and second largest region in the country) and 1,986,329 (Kankan, the largest region in the country⁶.)

- *Relevance of the methodology of intervention:* the approach of the project is definitely sound: by tackling the absence of mutual knowledge of the civil society and the judiciary and triggering dialogue between these two societal components it aimed at contributing to the process of reform of the judiciary through joint advocacy. A key point of strength of the methodology was the key concept that –in order to dialogue and cooperate- the beneficiaries of the project had first to be trained. This key concept informed the overall structure of the project so that participants to the two Outcomes of the project were largely the same.



Figure 1 – The Tribunals of first and second instance

The methodology was furthermore appropriate as it included the mini-grant component, which aimed at financing initiatives that were instrumental to the objectives of the project; this component was not maybe sufficiently explained and justified in the project document and would have deserved more analysis.

A further point of strength was that the project was ambitious without being over-ambitious and –on paper- all project activities could have been credibly carried out within the given timeframe.

However, the project design misses to specify one important aspect, which is the link between the necessarily experimental (pilot) nature of the intervention and its possible deployment to the entire territory of the country. The project clearly did not have sufficient resources for carrying out a ‘phase 2’ of its intervention; however some actions could have been included in the project design as to catalyse the interest of CSOs and representatives of magistrates from other regions in the dialogue civil society-judiciary and set the basis for a possible autonomous replication of the experiment in other regions.

- *Relevance of the expertise of the grantee:* the Project Document is greedy of details about this important point, which should have been better explained. Swisspeace has certainly a long established experience and solid reputation in areas that relate to the objectives of this project, with particular reference to Peace and Conflict Analysis; Facilitation of Dialogue and Dialogue Processes; and Capacity Building and Training. The main target beneficiaries of its interventions are CSOs and public institutions.

The project BEFORE (as described in the chapter III.i) had as its scope of action the

⁶ Based on the 2014 census

facilitation of processes aiming at preventing the escalation of conflicts. However, until this project Swisspeace had never developed (directly or through the project BEFORE) any intervention in the area of legal reform or linked with the judicial reform.

As a consequence of this, all the activities requiring a specific legal / judicial expertise had to be delegated to external (local) consultants, while the staff of the project BEFORE intervened directly for the parts of the UNDEF project dealing with management, facilitation of the dialogue (to some extent), monitoring of the performance of the grants, and setting up of the platforms that did not require a specific legal / judicial expertise.

Retrospectively and based on the analysis of performance, the following chapters will demonstrate that this aspect was appropriately managed and did not affect the possibility for the project to achieve its objectives. It is however to be underlined that this aspect should have been well underlined in the project design as it presented non questionable aspects of risks for the success of the project.

(ii) Effectiveness

As mentioned in chapter II.iii, throughout 2013 Guinea was deeply affected by a turbulent social and political situation; the opposition request for fair and transparent general elections (originally planned for June 2007, rescheduled for May 2013 and finally held in September) were supported by important mass protests that were convened periodically in Conakry and all major cities every Thursday since February. Violent clashes, ignited also by ethnic tensions erupted at several occasions and caused about 150 deaths throughout the country, and several persons were seriously injured. All commercial, economic and most of social activities were repeatedly blocked and the circulation in urban areas became frequently impossible; phone communications were frequently interrupted. When finally the elections were scheduled and the mass protests decreased in importance and violence, a consistent number of the project counterparts got involved in the electoral campaign and remained inaccessible for the project activities.

As reported by the Final Narrative Report and verified during the evaluation, this situation affected some crucial activities of the project (in particular those of the Outcome 2); some of them were rescheduled and delayed. In spite of this challenging situation, the project managed to deliver most of its outputs, factor that was much appreciated by many interviewees during the evaluation.

The project established a Steering Committee participated by representatives of the three categories targeted by the intervention (CSO, judges and key judiciary staff.) The Steering Committee (SC) was involved in several of the key moments of the project, which was then based on a much valued participatory and inclusive approach, which in turn helped strengthening the ownership of results.

Outcome 1 / Activity 1(training needs assessment) – The Activity (broken down into 4 sub-tasks) was fully achieved and the expected outputs delivered, timely. The SC was appropriately involved in the validation of the methodological tools developed to perform the needs assessment. The needs assessment was performed by two local consultants and the findings shared with the SC. This activity included the realisation of a workshop on basic notions of monitoring and evaluation, delivered to project staff and members of the SC as to

build their capacity to monitor and evaluate the small grants (Activity 4.)

Outcome 1 / Activity 2 (development of the training outline and materials) – The activity (broken down in 3 sub-tasks) was fully developed and the outputs delivered on time. In the performing of this activity the project management demonstrated a good deal of adaptability,



A common regional workshop in Conakry

which turned to be a critical factor of success of the intervention. The development of the training material was originally planned to be entrusted to three different local consultants (to be hired) expert in training and possessing a broad knowledge of the themes of training and acquainted with both civil society and the judiciary. Each of these consultants was then planned to become responsible for the production of the training outline and materials for one different trainee cluster; and its following delivery. It turned that none of the applicants possessed a

broad knowledge and understanding of both civil society and the judiciary; this was judged as a possible factor of risk for the project (the training messages could have been inconsistent), so that the plans were changed and two experts instead of three were hired. One trainer was expert in civil society, and the other in judicial issues; these experts were tasked to work as a team and to produce together the training outline and materials for all the training modules, so as to ensure full consistency of the key messages and materials. Together they were then tasked with the delivery of all training sessions, as to exploit to the best possible extent their respective competencies.

The SC was involved also in the crucial phases of this activity (change of recruitment strategy, development of the training grid, validation of the training material.)

Outcome 1 / Activity 3 (delivery of training) – The activity (broken down in 9 sub-tasks) was fully developed according to the schedule. The absolute target of training and trainees was achieved (60 judges, 60 CSO members and 60 auxiliaries of justice were trained, 30 each in Conakry and Kankan.) The gender target was missed as only 29 women were trained instead of the sought 54, 26 of them from CSOs. This is fully justified by the fact that the access to judiciary professions in Guinea is still largely dominated by men, so that no candidate women were available for the training.

Among the points of strength of this activity the following shall be underlined: i) The project management was involved –together with the SC- in the selection of the trainees; this helped preventing problems due to the non suitability of the profile of the trainees and to the excessive heterogeneity of the trainees groups. ii) The activity included the development of pre and post-training questionnaire, indispensable to assess the results of the training

delivered. iii) Each training module was piloted before its full deployment; this allowed the tuning of some training outlines. iv) A final debriefing workshop was held with the participation of the whole project team, the trainers, some trainees and the SC; this allowed to understand the key lessons from the training in view of the further activities of the project.

Outcome 1 / Activity 4 (advocacy and public awareness initiatives – small grant scheme) –

The activity (broken down in 4 sub-tasks) aimed at financing 10 small-scale grants for an overall budget of 30,000 USD. Following an open call for proposal the project received 15 proposals, which were assessed by an independent proposal assessment committee and scored based on a pre-defined selection grid; unfortunately it turned that only 7 proposals could be financed within the available budget, so the number of the proposals retained for financing was decreased. The activity was conducted within the planned timeframe. The achievements of the grants were monitored and self-evaluated based on criteria set during an initial training on M&E; this will be further specified and the findings from this analysis commented under chapter iv (Impact). There are some points of strength of this activity that deserve to be underlined: i) The topics of the selected grants (see Annex 3) clearly match with the objectives of the UNDEF project, so that indirectly the grants contributed to raise awareness of the need to strengthen the dialogue between civil society and judiciary; all in

all the grants reached some 200 direct and 1,500 indirect beneficiaries. ii) The process for the selection of the grants was public and transparent, based on pre-defined criteria for selection and the results were distributed to all applicants. iii) Before the beginning of their operations all grantees were given a 5-day training on monitoring and evaluation of their grants, so that M&E became an integral part of the micro-projects. iv) Shortly after the end of the grants (carried out between August 2012 and January 2013) a 2-day seminar was



A working group CSO-magistrates

organised to analyse the findings from M&E of the grants and share experiences.

Outcome 2 / Activity 1 (2 joint CSO-judiciary workshops) – This activity (structured in 7 sub-tasks) was carried out according to the plans. Each of the two workshops was participated by 25 people, and the composition in the two areas of intervention was the same: 15 CSO leaders, 7 judges and 3 auxiliaries of justice; once more the gender representation was unbalanced towards men (78% of participants) and the only women participating to the activity were CSO leaders; the reasons for this are the same described when discussing the results of the Activity 3 of Outcome 1. An important part of the work of facilitation was externalised to two local consultants.

The main point of strength of this activity was its link with the results of the trainings

delivered under the Outcome 1, which provided the inputs for the development of the tools to be used during a large part of the activities under the Outcome 2.

Outcome 2 / Activity 2 (setting up of the joint civil society-judicial platform) – This activity was conducted, but affected by the different factors explained in the opening of this chapter. As a consequence, the first platform meeting was organised the 2nd quarter of 2013 (instead of the 1st quarter), the 6 informal working meetings were finished by the 1st quarter of 2014 and an (unplanned but definitely opportune) public presentation of the platform was organised at



The logo of the platform with the motto: 'To bring defendant closer to justice'

the end of January 2014. Evidence gathered suggest that most of the follow-up actions to the setting up of the platform were de facto put on hold; this provoked delays to the conduction of the following activity 3. Overall it must be

concluded that the delays slightly impacted on the timeline of the activity 2 but did not affect the achievement of its objectives: the project adapted in a flexible way to unforeseeable events and was able to reschedule some crucial events even at the very last minute.

During its first events the platform (it took the name of 'Forum Civilo-Judiciaire', FCJ) laid the foundation for its formal constitution: this will be further commented when discussing impacts.

Outcome 2 / Activity 3 (development of the platform Action Plan) – This activity (one single sub-task) was conducted mostly impacted by the factors explained in the opening of this chapter, and in particular by the fact that after the setting up of the platform the development of the Action Plan that had to be prepared by the technical commission of the platform was severely delayed. As a result the Action Plan (that was due by the 2nd quarter 2013) was in reality finally validated only in March 2014 (three months after the planned end of the contract.) In reality and retrospectively the planning of this activity was over-optimistic, as its original schedule immediately following the first platform meeting did not take into due account the time needed to develop the AP by the newly appointed technical commission and the time needed to get to an agreement with the members of the platform.

Outcome 2 / Activity 4 (distribution / promotion of the platform Action Plan) – This activity (3 sub-task) was largely impacted by the delays in previous phases, and in particular by the delays in the development of the AP. As a result, the promotion of the AP was cut short: about 300 copies of the AP were distributed against the 2,000 that were originally planned and 6 instead of 10 promotional meetings with key stakeholders were held, all of them towards the very last weeks of the project extension.

(iii) Efficiency

As described in II.i, the overall planned budget was USD 325,000; the UNDEF contribution counted for USD 200,000 and an individual grantor (Mr Milt Lauenstein) made available the residual USD 125,000. Additional USD 100,000 (unplanned at the time of the application to UNDEF) were provided by the United States Institute of Peace.

UNDEF was therefore the major single donor of the project, which financed about 47% of its overall costs. The contribution of Mr Lauenstein was mainly used for the project office (renting, equipment, and related costs) and parts of the salaries of the permanent staff, while the funds provided by USIS were used to contribute to the payment of salaries and for the organisation of the five-day training on monitoring for grantees and the final workshop on lessons learnt from the implementation of grants.

The UNDEF budget was fully used. The chart in the following Figure 2 shows the budget attribution to its major components; it does not include the budget of the two further donors, so that no conclusions can be made on the overall appropriateness of the allocation of financial resources. The portion of budget financed by UNDEF shows a very appreciated focus on the key activities of the project (all in all they total 81% of the budget, that is Meetings and training, Advocacy and Grants) and a very tiny budget devoted to travels (justified by the local travels between the two project locations, while international travels are extremely limited as the intervention was entirely developed by local staff and partners.)

Nothing can be said about the budget for salaries and consultant fees as the funds of the other donors contributed to these budget items in a proportion that is unknown. The contribution of UNDEF to these costs is fully justified.

The project had an important staff turnover (3 employees left) that was analysed during the evaluation as to understand its reasons and repercussions in terms of efficiency.

The causes of the abandoning of 2 of these employees are fully justified and do not link with problems in management. Obvious reasons of privacy do not allow the evaluator to disclose more details.

The sudden abandoning of the project accountant and his disappearance is reportedly in relation with the theft of USD 18,000 from the project cash, amount that was paid back by Swisspeace. A judicial complaint was filed against this former employee.

The project efficiency was not impacted by the replacement of the 3 employees that left the project in terms of respect of the timeline.

The rescheduling of some project events had some budget consequences in terms of travel costs and renting of meeting rooms; however these were of a minor entity and were not a cause of problems in terms of financial management




Figure 2 – Project budget breakdown

(iv) Impact

Under very demanding conditions due to the non materialisation of the first assumption identified in the Project Document (*Stable political and security conditions, particularly during elections*) the project was able to achieve tangible effects under both its Outcomes. As indicated in the chapter III.i, the project design includes provision for a M&E plan, which is based both on key indicators of performance formulated in the Project Document; and on indicators of performance of the small grant scheme, identified during the M&E workshop held right at the beginning of the operation of the grants.

The analysis of the findings from this M&E activity provides a good initial basis for concluding on the impact of the project (and in particular of its Outcome 1); the findings were triangulated during the phase of field interviews. In general the project team well documented its M&E processes, even if some crucial information is missing.

Outcome 1 (Increased capacity of CSOs, magistrates and key judicial personnel for advocacy, monitoring and judicial oversight) – The project set for itself three measurable indicators that help assessing the impact of this project component:

I. *Target:* 60% of participants to training (all trainee clusters: magistrates, CSO, auxiliaries of justice) had to increase, considerably their knowledge of the judicial system, its

working mechanisms and the working mechanisms of the auxiliaries of justice. The same percentage had to be able to identify and describe the roles of the other two clusters.

Achieved: 87% of participants achieved this objective (reported by the project).

Method of analysis: pre-post training individual test.

Comments on the validity of the method of analysis: the method of analysis is valid and based on well formulated and articulated test templates. However, the target (60%) seems definitely low and therefore generous to the project; a 70-75% target would have appeared more consistent with the activities undertaken. In any case the results achieved (87%) are higher than what could have been reasonably expected. The project missed to inform what was the entry level of participants (baseline).

Triangulation of findings: the key element of analysis during the interviews was the assessment of the training given by former trainees in terms of use made of the new knowledge acquired; former trainees were furthermore invited to disclose their opinions about strengths and weaknesses of the training. All interviewees recognise that the main *strength* of the training was the respective knowledge acquired of the other 'clusters' participating to the initiative. Some judges admit that before training they ignored basic elements of knowledge of the roles and working methods of civil society that could be relevant to their work; and CSO members admit their baseline absence of knowledge of the judiciary and of the role of the auxiliaries of justice. This has been remedied thanks to the training. The main *weaknesses* of the training for many are its short duration and the insufficient time set aside for discussion; the fact that it was organised only in the two selected locations and not extended to the whole country; and the amount of the per diem that was judged as too low to pay the participation costs. Regarding the *new knowledge acquired*, there is evidence revealing that some former trainees started making use of it and that there is a constant attention of many to identify –in their daily life– the opportunity to apply it. A few success stories are worth to be mentioned and regard all trainee clusters. They are reported in the following text box.

II. *Target:* 60% of participants to training have their capacity of advocacy largely reinforced and are able to identify 2-3 advocacy techniques.

Achieved: 62% of CSOs participating to training achieved this objective (reported by the project.) This training was not delivered to the other trainee clusters because during the planning of training the trainers and the SC remarked that judges and auxiliaries of justice do not have the right to participate to the political life and to advocacy initiatives.

Method of analysis: pre-post training individual test.

I recently had a case of litigation between two trade unions, and this was solved also thanks to what I learned during the training

A magistrate in Kankan

In case of litigation, now I always encourage the parties to find a negotiated solution

An auxiliary of justice

Thanks to the training I now understand more about the functioning of the judicial system and my NGO plans to establish a centre of juridical advice

A CSO member

As vice-president of the youth in my neighborhood I have now more instruments to tackle and better solve the conflicts

A CSO member

Comments on the validity of the method of analysis: Also in this case the method of analysis is valid and based on well formulated and articulated test templates. The target (60%) seems appropriate for participants with low education to advocacy techniques, but the project missed to inform about the baseline situation.

Triangulation of findings: based on interviews with CSO trainees. However, in reason of the delays in the setting up of the platform, very few findings were expected from this analysis. The interviews conducted confirm that former trainees have a better understanding of advocacy and that they plan to use the techniques learnt during training to advocate the interests of civil society within the frame of the reform of justice. No concrete actions are reported insofar.

III. *Target:* 80% of target population reached by the activities of the small grant scheme in the areas subject of the interventions.

Achieved: 70% (reported by the project.)

Method of analysis: based on self-assessment of the grantees and organised through templates developed during the initial training on M&E.

Comments on the validity of the method of analysis: The approach to M&E of the small grant scheme is very much appreciated by evaluators. It was well organised, appropriately transmitted during the initial training, correctly implemented and well analysed during the debriefing seminar. However, the identification of just one indicator to reflect the impact of the 7 grant schemes is inappropriate; moreover, no information is given on the identification of the target population and on the means of verification – so that the achievements under this indicator cannot be commented. Having said that, the under-performance could be explained by the lower number of small grants that was financed (7 instead of the planned 10.)

Triangulation of findings: based on detailed analysis of the findings from M&E and on interviews with grantees. The success rate of the small grants was different but the large majority of them (5 out of 7) hit their objectives; the reasons for the under performance of the 2 partly unsuccessful grants was in one case the inconsistency between the resources and the objectives; and in the other case the very theoretical nature of the project (reading of reference texts to participants with very low basic education.) The points of strength of the initiatives were the high commitment of those involved and the identification of specific 'niches' of activity that were relevant at the local level; and (for some) the capacity to liaise / involve authorities at the local level. The most important findings from this experience (as reported in the Final Narrative Report) are included in the Annex 3; they include cases of reinforcement of

The district chiefs are now more committed to defend citizens.

...There is more dialogue now between authorities and citizens, and the district chiefs play a key role in helping setting the litigations.

...Recently an NGO helped citizens in letting their voice heard through dialogue during a case of industrial pollution.

...If a problem emerges, I know now where to go

Some voices during a group interview in Fria

We established a neighborhood council for conflict resolution, and citizens start using it. We animate a weekly community radio broadcast and have spread the message four time at the Mosque, and this helped in informing people.

One member of a beneficiary NGO

capacities and reputation of some grantees; contribution to the mitigation of tensions during the electoral campaign; and contribution to the management of social conflicts through the collaboration between judicial police officers and neighborhood leaders. As reported under IV.ii and assessed by the project, the small grants had an outreach capacity of (at least) 200 direct and 1,500 indirect beneficiaries. This corresponds to a unitary cost of USD 17.6 per participant, which reveals an appreciable value for money of the intervention.

The interview realised with the beneficiaries of two of these grants confirm the impact of these activities at the local level, both at the level of a higher knowledge and understanding of the judicial processes; and at the level of a higher capacity to solve the litigations through mediation preventing the escalation of conflicts. In the case of one of the two grants it emerged the value of disseminating the key messages of the activity through a community radio station; and at the Mosque.

In conclusion, there is an overall positive judgment about the impact of this first component of the project, and what claimed by the project in the relevant parts of its Final Narrative Report (Chapters 6 and 9) is convincing. More in specific, the detailed qualitative analysis contained in the majority of the bullets of the Chapter 9 is sound and shared by the evaluators; the key emerging elements of impact of this project component are:

- The decreased mutual mistrust between civil society and members of the judiciary thanks to the training and the various meetings that have brought together people of these different clusters.
- The commitment of civil society and members of the judiciary to plan joint actions to improve the quality of justice and make it more accessible to citizens.
- The linking up of auxiliaries of justice pertaining to different professional categories to find solutions to problems due to scarce knowledge and misunderstanding of the work of the different professions.
- The increased reputation acquired by the project partners (trainers and other consultants involved) and of the NGOs that were financed under the small grants scheme.
- A higher level of understanding –by district chiefs participating in the project- of their role and of its boundaries in helping the resolution of conflicts.

Outcome 2 (Enhanced dialogue and collaboration on how to improve the judicial system so that it is more responsive to civil society needs) – The project set for itself some quantitative indicators (Chapter 6 of the Final Narrative Report); however these indicators are more relevant to understand the effectiveness rather than the impact of this project component.

The analysis of the impact of this project component shall take into consideration the effects of the establishment of the civil society-judicial platform and of its first activities. As described above, the platform was established with well-justified delays and its operations just started at the time of the evaluation; as a consequence, no clear signs of impact could be detected at the time of the evaluation, and the following remarks flag the likelihood of this project component to achieve its expected impact.

- The setting up of the platform have potentialities of generating the following positive effects:

- The platform represents a chance and a place for the three clusters of project beneficiaries to continue dialogue on possibilities to prevent the escalation of social conflicts. From this perspective, the platform can act as a reinforcing factor of the effects of the project achieved under the Outcome 1.
- The platform represents indeed the possibility for a joint civil society / judiciary participation to the process of reform of the judiciary. The late formulation of the Action Plan did not allow, yet the platform to achieve tangible results under this perspective, but the fact that the platform has been already invited to some meetings at the Ministry of Justice to participate to the planning of the reform is an encouraging factor.

Obviously, there are conditions for the achievement of long-lasting results of this project component; these will be discussed in the following chapter v (Sustainability.)

- The idea of the setting up the platform was a ground-breaking initiative that is now very much appreciated by national authorities and international organisations present in Conakry and active in the sector of justice (EU, UNDP.) This element should concur to the achievement of long-lasting results and-if duly exploited- could bring to the replication of the initiative or its full deployment countrywide.

- The most important heritage of this project is the unexpected effect of the formal establishment of the platform as an authorised NGO. During their very first meetings the founding members of the platform decided, unanimously that in order to better exploit the potentialities of this instrument they had to move from an informal to rather a formal, registered structure for the platform. Accordingly, the statute of the platform was approved and the governing bodies were elected; it followed the request for the formal registration of the platform, which is still pending at the time of writing.

This decision was unexpected and immediately supported by Swisspeace, which legated to the platform the office equipment that was bought for the conduction of the project.

The formalisation of the platform as a registered body should contribute to the achievement of a higher level of visibility and its recognition by the relevant state administrations as a formal counterpart during the process of reform of the judiciary.

(v) Sustainability

What described under 'Impact' shows that the legacy of this project under the Outcome 2 has wide possibilities to achieve long-lasting results; these possibilities are definitely higher now after the recent approval of important institutional and legal reforms such as the special status of judges, the establishment of the Superior Council of Magistrates, and the finalization of the Action Plan of the judicial reform.

However, key pre-conditions for achieving sustainability are still to be met and this is largely due to the delays in the setting up and first operations of the platform. These pre-conditions are:

- *The replication of the project and its deployment countrywide.* As demonstrated in this evaluation this was a largely successful and innovative project, which

was based on a sound method of intervention that can be replicated with success. The impact of such a project will considerably decrease if it will not be generalised to all the judiciary districts of the country. Aware of this aspect, Swisspeace conducted a fundraising activity for a phase 2 of the project; unfortunately –while some funds may have been available from some donors- no donors’ budget could be allocated to pay the indispensable office costs and salaries, which by many organisations are regarded as ‘overheads’ and as such not financed. This could be easily become a killing factor of the achievements of this project.

- *The achievement by the platform of a higher level of visibility.* As above described, the platform achieved already some levels of visibility and this is demonstrated by the fact that it has been invited by the Ministry of Justice to participate to official discussions within the frame of the reform of the judiciary. However, during a conversation with the EU Delegation in July emerged that the platform acquired this visibility (in particular to the international donors’ community) only recently and that the project remained for a long time rather invisible during its implementation. The EUD (which is the official coordinator of the donors’ coordination in Guinea) remarks that the platform should participate more regularly than what is actually doing to the discussions leading to the reform of the judiciary and that its participations are until now quite sporadic.

- *The further involvement of the platform within the process of reform.* This is the right moment for the platform to assume a strategic role within the process of reform; the priorities and main objectives of the reform are being discussed and the international donors’ community is about to inject major investments in supporting the process. The main contributor will certainly be the EU, which will donate 20 mEuro through the project PARJU to be financed under its 10th EDF. The ToR of the project are now under finalisation and the activities will start in early 2015; they should support the government's efforts in promoting democratic principles and human rights, especially in the field of justice and the fight against impunity in Guinea. It will, inter alia, finance activities for an increased access to a quality justice and the reform of the prison system.

(vi) UNDEF added value

Two elements were identified during the evaluation and represented two points of strength of this intervention:

- *The reputation of the UN system in Guinea.* Although UNDEF as such was unknown to the project partners and beneficiaries, the UN system in Guinea has a very good reputation, which served as an important credential for the project throughout its activities. The visibility of UNDEF was ensured at all the project events and in the public deliverables of the project, which is a factor that should have helped in starting to build a solid reputation for the Fund in the two areas of the intervention.

The low bureaucratic / administrative pressure on the grantee. As discussed, the project had to adapt, quickly and repeatedly to unforeseeable events: different activities had to be rescheduled and replanned, an additional funder joined in, a different number of trainers were hired etc. This very much needed activity of modification of the plans was definitely facilitated by the low administrative / bureaucratic pressure and by the possibility of direct and informal contacts with the UNDEF headquarters, as needed.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

i. The project was particularly relevant to the country situation and the process of reform of the judiciary announced by the President of Guinea since 2010. It has acquired even more relevance after the September 2013 election when Guinea finally got rid of its recent and difficult political heritage, following the dictatorship period, and –since- the Country has embarked in a process of democratic reforms. One of the institutions that has to be reformed the most is the judiciary, which is consistently accused of recurrent problems of inefficiency, nepotism and corruption. The present government is tackling this aspect with determination and some concrete results are already visible: they include the approval of the special status of judges, the establishment of the Superior Council of Magistrates, and the finalization of the Action Plan of the judicial reform.(See Chapter II.iii)

ii. The idea to facilitate dialogue between civil society, magistrates and auxiliaries of justice was proposed by Swisspeace as a way for civil society to participate to the process of reform of the judiciary; and for helping de-escalating social conflicts before their radicalisation. The idea to establish a joint civil society-platform as an instrument for this collaboration was ground-breaking and proved to be a very opportune one. (See Chapters III.i and IV.iv)

iii. The project was convincingly structured around two components (Outputs), well designed and its ambitions were consistent with the available resources. The Project Document contained a well-thought analysis of constraints and a set of relevant indicators of performance was formulated. The project design included the provision for a sound activity of Monitoring and Evaluation, which is very much appreciated as an indicator of the real commitment of the grantee to achieve the expected results of the intervention. From this perspective, the project was suitably designed. However, the fact that the grantee had no previous experiences in implementing projects in the justice sector should have been well underlined in the Project Document as an important factor of risk of the project; retrospectively, this possible risk did not materialise (See Chapters III.i and IV.i)

iv. The relevance of the project was high under all its aspects: it was fully consistent with the UNDEF mandate, it was highly relevant to the needs of the country, the two areas selected for the intervention were suitable and the proposed methodology of intervention was appropriate. (See Chapter IV.i)

v. Throughout 2013 Guinea was deeply affected by a turbulent social and political situation: several mass protests to request democratic elections turned into clashes, ignited also by ethnic tensions. About 150 deaths represented the toll of this year, which coincided with the second year of life of the project. There were impacts on the timely delivery of some of the expected outputs, particularly under the Outcome 2. In the end, the largest majority of the outputs were delivered because the project team proved an

appreciable capacity of adaptation to unforeseeable events; from this perspective the project was a clear case of success. However, the (fully justified) late establishment of the joint civil-society platform and its late entering in operation caused some effects in terms of impact. (See Chapter IV.ii)

vi. The project was efficiently managed and the budget contributed by UNCTAD (about 47% of the overall budget) was appropriately allocated and fully spent. Swisspeace proved to be highly committed to results; this, which is a recurrent remark of this evaluation, is furthermore proved by the fact that about 81% of the budget was allocated to project activities, with a minimal impact of further budget items. The rescheduling of some activities had some minimal impact in terms of budget due to double travel costs and renting of meeting space; this is justified and was well managed. The project had an important staff turnover, which did not hide problems related to management; the replacement of the staff that left did not impact the project efficiency. The project cash suffered of a theft of USD 18,000, and a judicial action has been initiated against the suspect responsible (a former member of the staff.) The grantee refunded the project with its own funds. (See Chapter IV.iii)

vii. In terms of impact the project contribution is very high for the Output 1 (capacity building and dialogue) while the short time passed since the entering in operation of the platform prevented the materialisation of signs of impact of the Output 2 (collaboration to the process of reform.) However, the potentialities for the major legacy of the project (the platform) to contribute to the materialisation of the project impact are realistic and some early signs are encouraging. (See Chapter IV.iv)

viii. The pre-conditions for the achievement of the sustainability of results are still to be met, and this is by large due to the mentioned delays. The deployment of the project countrywide (preparatory actions should have been included since the design phase); the achievement by the platform of a higher level of visibility to the international donors' community; and its capacity to get further involved in the process of reform are these pre-conditions. Wide spaces are now opening up thanks to the announced EU support to the process of reform of the judiciary with a budgetary envelope worth 20 mEuro. (See Chapter IV.v)

ix. There are two elements making up the UNDEF added value of this intervention; they are the high reputation of the UN system in Guinea, which proved to be a useful element of credentials for the project staff throughout the life of the intervention; and the low administrative and bureaucratic pressure on the grantee, which proved to be a key element that facilitated the various cycles of replanning of the project activities. (See Chapter IV.vi)

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

To strengthen the likelihood of similar project in the future to achieve their expected results, the evaluators issue two different groups of recommendations to UNDEF and project grantees. The following, **first cluster of recommendations** aim at encouraging future projects to draw on the successful experiences made by this project:

i. To ensure that future interventions rely on a sound design of the project logic of intervention and to aim to achieve results that are consistent with the available resources, as it was the case for this project (reference to Conclusion iii).

ii. To ensure that future interventions include –as it was the case for this project- a sound plan for monitoring and evaluation as an integral part of the project design; this enhances the likelihood of the project to achieve the expected results and proves the commitment of the grantee to results. Some additional efforts should be made in documenting the results of the monitoring and evaluation activities (reference to Conclusion iii).

iii. To keep the projects flexible and adaptable to unforeseeable events as relevant, while ensuring that the orientation towards the final objectives of the interventions is always reflected on the new / rescheduled activities (reference to Conclusion v).

The following, **second cluster of recommendations** is based on two aspects that this project should have better managed:

iv. To bind applicants to identify in their proposals not only external but also internal risks such as the absence of key personnel or of in-house expertise that could endanger the success of the intervention. This element shall be duly assessed when evaluating the proposals for grant (reference to Conclusion iii).

v. To invite grantees to reflect and propose solutions to the need to deploy projects of a pilot nature to the whole territory of the country, in case of their success. This could be addressed since the project design phase by making provision of mechanism facilitating the autonomous replication of the project experiences, once the project finished. (reference to Conclusion viii)

VIII. ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: EVALUATION QUESTIONS

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	▪ Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context? ▪ Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why? ▪ Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	▪ To what extent have the project's objectives been reached? ▪ To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not? ▪ Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives? ▪ What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	▪ Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs? ▪ Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability? ▪ Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	▪ To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address? ▪ Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative? ▪ To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization? ▪ Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	▪ To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact? ▪ Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?
UNDEF value-added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	▪ What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, which could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc.). ▪ Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?

ANNEX 2: MAIN DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

- UDF-GUI-10-355, *Project document*, November 2011
- UDF-GUI-10-355, *Rapport d'observation d'étape-clé*, août 2012
- UDF-GUI-10-355, *Milestone financial utilization report*, May 2013
- UDF-GUI-10-355, *Rapport d'observation d'étape-clé*, juin 2013
- UDF-GUI-10-355, *Rapport narratif final du projet*, mai 2014
- UDF-GUI-10-355, the 39 annexes to the *Rapport narratif final du projet*, various dates
- <http://milt-idea-exchange.blogspot.be/>
- <http://societyforscience.typepad.com/ssp/2012/08/sts-1943-alum-milt-lauenstein-strives-to-prevent-violence-around-the-world.html>
- http://boldergiving.org/stories.php?story=Milt-Lauenstein_34
- <http://www.usip.org/>
- <http://www.swisspeace.ch/>
- http://www.landinfo.no/asset/1838/1/1838_1.pdf
- http://www.guinee-plurielle.com/pages/20La_Reforme_du_Systeme_Judiciaire-1117400.html
- <http://guineeactu.info/debats-discussions/analyse/618-le-systeme-judiciaire-guineen-ou-la-confusion-des-pouvoirs.html>
- On the situation in Guinea in 2012 and 2013: information available at <http://www.reuters.com>, <http://conflictbase.com/events/country/Guinea>, <http://www.osiwa.org/en/portal/newsroom/268/Guinea-Country-Report-2012.htm>, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea.aspx>, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinean_legislative_election,_2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Guinea_clashes

ANNEX 3: THE SELECTED GRANTS

- Projet d'appui à l'amélioration de la qualité de la justice dans la région administrative de Kankan - *Project to support the improvement of the quality of justice in the administrative region of Kankan* (Association pour la promotion de la gouvernance et des initiatives locales (AGIL))
- Plaidoyer et sensibilisation sur le droit à la santé en milieu carcéral dans les villes de Conakry et Coyah - *Advocacy and awareness on the right to health in prisons in Conakry and Coyah* (Association pour la promotion de la santé en Guinée (APROSAG))
- Renforcement de la collaboration entre les chefs de quartiers et les officiers de la police judiciaire de la commune urbaine de Dubréka pour une meilleure application de la justice - *Strengthening of the collaboration between neighborhood leaders and officers of the Judicial Police of the municipality of Dubréka for a better administration of justice* (Association guinéenne des femmes pour le développement intégré - AGUIFEDI)
- Sensibilisation des populations de Fria sur le rôle de la justice et de la société civile pour l'instauration d'une véritable démocratie - *Awareness of the population of Fria on the role of the judiciary and civil society for the establishment of a genuine democracy* (Association des jeunes étudiants et diplômés pour le développement de Fria - AJEDDEF)
- Appui à la Promotion de la réforme judiciaire en Guinée dans les cinq communes de Conakry - *Support to the promotion of the judicial reform in Guinea in five communes of Conakry* (Association "Sourire International")
- Connais ton droit, accomplis ton devoir - *Know your rights, do your duty* (Organisation guinéenne de droit et devoir du citoyen - OGDDC)
- Participation de la société civile à la concertation et à l'action citoyenne sur l'amélioration du fonctionnement de la Justice dans la Préfecture de Coyah – *Participation of civil society to consultation and citizen action to improve the functioning of justice in the Prefecture of Coyah* (Union des jeunes volontaires de Coyah - UJVC)

Main findings from the monitoring and evaluation of the grants :

- During the implementation of their projects, the recipient CSOs had the opportunity to strengthen their presence and reputation in their respective areas of interventions. Some of them have developed key strategic partnerships with authorities, government departments and other organizations of civil society. For example, the Association of Young Students and Graduates for the Development of Fria now receives special attention from the prefectural authorities, which required this association to lead the implementation of the capacity building project of the Fria municipal police.
- The implementation of initiatives has helped to reduce tensions between activists of different factions during the electoral campaign, as participants in the various activities undertaken by grantees belonged to different political parties. During sensitization sessions, political differences were set aside and priority was given to the common objective of achieving the project results. This has been noticed more in

projects from the inner parts of the country, where local leaders are more acquainted with each other.

- The implementation of grants has enabled some social groups to meet and discuss the divisive problems they face in carrying out their respective field work. This was notably the case between neighbourhood leaders and judicial police officers in Dubréka. The discussions they had during training helped both groups to better manage conflicts through agreements and dialogue.
- Overall the implementation of the grants mobilized at least 200 direct beneficiaries and more than 1,500 people who participated in awareness sessions or final workshops.

ANNEX 4: SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS

23 June 2014	
Abdoulaye Diallo	Project Team Leader (remote + f2f interview)
25 June 2014	
Heinz Krummenacher	Swisspeace, Director (remote interview)
Nadina Diday	Swisspeace, Project Manager (remote interview)
27 June 2014	
Saa Foré Millimono	Judge in Conakry
Hassane 2 Diallo	Executive Secretary of the programme of reform of Justice, Ministry of Justice, Conakry
Thierno Younoussa Bah	Free lance journalist, Conakry
28 June 2014	
Moussa Bangoura	Beneficiary of a small grant, Fria
Group interview with 10 participants to one small grant: 6 CSO members 3 district chiefs 1 auxiliary of justice	Fria
29 June 2014	
Elhadj Aboubacar Camara	Judge in Kankan
Abdoulaye Sampou	Judge in Kankan
30 June 2014	
Aboubacar Sylla	CSO member, Conakry
Alsény Bah	Auxiliary of justice, Conakry
Adama Skel Fofana	Lawyer, member of the platform
Mohamed Camara	Trainer
1 July 2014	
Fodé Mariama Camara	Auxiliary of Justice, President of the platform
Mohamed Ben Touré	Beneficiary of a small grant, Conakry
5 July 2014	
Kadiatou Bangoura	Beneficiary of a small grant, Dubréka
6 July 2014	
Alpha Sény Camara	General Secretary of the Association of Magistrates of Guinea and Judge in Kankan
Ousmane Keïta	CSO member, Kankan
Abdoulaye Conté	Auxiliary of justice, Kankan
Luncény Chérif	Member of the Steering Committee and member of the platform, Kankan
8 July 2014	
Fatoumata Lamarana Diallo	CSO Member, beneficiary of a small grant and member of the platform
25 July 2014	
Beatriz Betegon Ramiro	EU Delegation in Guinea, Programme Manager, Economy and Governance
Chérif Karamo	UNDP, Conakry office, Coordinator 'Conflict prevention'

ANNEX 5: ACRONYMS

AP	Action Plan
CROSC	Conseil Régional des organisations de la société civile
CNOSCG	Conseil National des organisations de la société civile
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EUD	European Union Delegation
FCJ	Forum Civilo-Judiciaire
F2f	Face-to-face
IMF	International Monetary Fund
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
RGP	Rally of Guinean People
SC	Steering Committee
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USD	United States Dollar